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Abstract – The succeeding code for metamorphic Malware is routinely rewritten to 
remain stealthy and undetected within infected environments. This characteristic is 
maintained by means of encryption and decryption methods, obfuscation through 
garbage code insertion, code transformation and registry modification which makes 
detection very challenging. The main objective of this study is to contribute an 
evidence-based narrative demonstrating the effectiveness of recent proposals. Sixteen 
primary studies were included in this analysis based on a pre-defined protocol. The 
majority of the reviewed detection methods used Opcode, Control Flow Graph (CFG) 
and API Call Graph. Key challenges facing the detection of metamorphic malware 
include code obfuscation, lack of dynamic capabilities to analyse code and application 
difficulty. Methods were further analysed on the basis of their approach, limitation, 
empirical evidence and key parameters such as dataset, Detection Rate (DR) and 
False Positive Rate (FPR). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The habit of downloading unknown files over the Internet seem to be the key reason for 
infecting computer systems with Malware. Malicious software has the potential to infect 
system files, write extreme data on adjacent memory, leading to buffer overflow, and 
change codes of other executable files. History of Malware evolution shows that many 
malicious software were written for fun or testing software behaviour. However, state-of-
the-art malware is also developed for financial gain (Alam et al., 2014c), political 
influence, enabling anti-social behaviour such as cyberstalking (al-Khateeb et al., 2016), 
or to sabotaging the defence systems of a country. Consequently, malware coding became 
extremely sophisticated. Figure 1 demonstrates a simplistic view of malware evolution 
since the 1970s (Rad et al., 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. Malware evolution 
Since the first malware written in the last century, a rivalry has started between defenders 
(e.g. researchers) and malware developers who continue to adopt new evasion techniques 
(Sharma and Sahay, 2014). 
 
A first-generation malware is relatively easy to identify using traditional antivirus 
software. Detection in this case requires a library of static byte-signatures, hash-signatures 
and any code or strings depending on the technique used. Signatures of malicious files are 
stored in database files (.mdb, .idb, etc.) to facilitate the detection process. Infected files 
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are usually quarantined and could also be moved to a Sandbox for further analysis. 
Signature-based scanning is considered fast compared to non-signature-based detection. In 
contrast, malware writers nowadays use obfuscation techniques to evade detection (Karim 
et al., 2005). These techniques can be classified into pattern-based, content-based and 
protocol based methods. Their functionality includes the insertion of garbage code, 
changing the execution order of instruction, automatically regenerated code (through a 
metamorphic engine) and variable renaming (Christodorescu and Jha, 2004). This mutation 
capability of code is called ‘metamorphism’ in which the program changes the structural 
properties of the executable without any change in behaviour. Metamorphic malware is 
therefore a software program with the capability to change its code and signature on its 
propagation. It has its own encrypted virus-body coated with a decryption routine, both of 
which are changed in the propagation phase. Therefore, current antivirus programs have 
difficulties detecting this type of malware (Lyda and Hamrock, 2007). 
  
Nonetheless, various methods, frameworks and detection systems have been 
proposed to encounter obfuscation techniques with the majority utilising Opcode 
Sequence, Control Flow Graph, N-gram and API Calls (as shown in Table 1). While every 
approach has its own benefits and limitation, a hybrid method combining two or more of 
these could overcome some of the challenges and increase performance. These methods 
perform static analysis prior to any file execution. Then, the process extracts Opcode and 
Bytecode sequences, and generate graphs by disassembling the file (Egele et al., 2012). 
Static analysis is considered robust yet suffers when the source code of the file is not 
available. Further, it does not have the ability to identify new malware (Wu et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, dynamic analysis does not rely on the code. Instead, it monitors the 
behaviour of the file during its execution in a Sandbox, which is a securely restricted 
environment to facilitate the analysis of unknown or untrusted files (Egele et al., 2012). 
Behaviour is more unique and consistent compared to the static features of a malicious file, 
it could therefore help to thwart the different variants of Malware and declare their 
obfuscation techniques irrelevant (Dai and Kuo, 2007). However, behavioural analysis is 
relatively more resource consuming, lengthy and could result in many false-positives 
(Fukushima et al., 2010). Hence, an integrated system balancing the trade-off between 
instant detection and long-term detection procedures could lead to effective and efficient 
solutions for metamorphic malware (Shijo and Salim, 2015). 
 
 The remaining parts of this paper are organised as follows: Section II shares the 
methodology and protocol used for this systematic literature review. Section III contains 
detailed critical analysis of the detection techniques surveyed. Finally, conclusions and 
further discussions are stated in Section IV. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 
A systematic review is conducted with reference to the comprehensive guidelines 
published by Kitchenham and Charters, (2007). We aim to implement unbiased protocol 
to include recent studies on metamorphic malware detection. The following sections 
elaborates further details on the research questions, data selection and extraction strategy. 
A. Research questions (RQs) 
 
RQs. What type of detection techniques and methods have recently been presented and 
tested for metamorphic malware detection? Which of these techniques is more effective in 
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detecting metamorphic malware? And what are the key challenges facing the detection 
process? 
 
We address these RQs with a critical analysis of the included studies. 
 
B. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 
Papers matching the following conditions will be included in this study: 
✓ A recent study published within the last 5 years 
✓ Papers must present a novel malware detection technique 
✓ Papers must present empirical evidence e.g. statistics for evaluation purposes 
 
Papers matching the following conditions will then excluded: 
 Non-peer reviewed papers such as descriptive reports and technical reports 
 Abstracts, editorials, and books. 
 Papers not written in English.  
 Papers focusing on malware classification methods. 
 
C. Data Source and Search Strategy 
 
Robust and popular databases covering the discipline of computer science and technology 
had been selected to be the data sources, these were: IEEE Xplore, ACM DL, Springer, 
Science Direct, and Scopus. Included studies have been published between January 2010 
and June 2015. Logical operators ‘AND’ and ‘OR’, and Search keywords related to the 
proposed research question and topic were used; ‘Metamorphic’, ‘Malware’, ‘Virus’, 
‘Detection’, ‘Method’, ‘System’ and ‘Technique’. Targeted fields were the Title, Abstract, 
and Keywords. Advance search options were applied to enforce inclusion and restriction 
criteria such as publication time and article type. We have also examined the bibliographies 
of selected studies. 
 
D. Primary Study Selection Process 
 
The selection process was performed on the databases and reviewed by the authors 
accordingly. First, the retrieved number of filtered articles pulled from the databases was 
113. These articles were then taken to the next process. Second, Title and abstract base 
Selection: the examination was scoped at these two parts for each article. When there was 
doubt, the article was included for the next phase. A total of 37 articles remained. And 
finally, Full Text Selection: Remaining articles were thoroughly read. A total of 21 articles 
were discarded, leaving 16 key articles most of which seem to have come from IEEE.  
 
E. Data extraction 
 
Data to be extracted from included studies will be: Article type (Journal, Conference, etc.); 
citation details; technique used; experimental results (e.g. Detection Rate (DR), False 
Positive Rate (FPR), and dataset size); strengths and limitations; and any technical 
challenges reported. 
 
F. Evaluation measures 
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The effectiveness of the proposed malware detection methods can be measured by means 
of DR and FPR. Hence, it is also important to highlight the following: 
• True Positive (TP). The number of correctly identified malicious files as malware. 
• False Positive (FP). The number of incorrectly identified benign files as malware. 
• True Negative (TN): The number of correctly identified benign files as benign. 
• False Negative (FN): The number of incorrect identified malware files as benign. 
• And DR = TP/ (TP+FN), while FPR = FP/ (TN+FP) (Alam et al., 2014c). 
F. Quality assessment threshold 
 
A list of quality assessment questions facilitated the evaluation of primary studies in this 
systematic review. Studies must satisfy all the following threshold criteria with a ‘yes’: 
1- Are the study objectives stated clearly? 
2- Does the evaluation fulfil the purpose of the primary study? 
3- Is the conclusion supported by empirical evidence? 
4- Are the methods specified for data analysis and collection thoroughly described?  
5- Were the DR or FPR reported? 
 
III. Analysis of detection techniques 
 
Included studies recovered various detection techniques, the sample have been analysed in 
Table 1, while main themes conceptualised in Figure 2 and discussed in the remaining 
subsections. 
 
 
Figure 2 Metamorphic Malware Detection Approaches. References included in our review are 
discussed for each of these categories in the following subsections A to E. 
A. Operational Code (Opcode) 
 
An executable program is a construction of a series of machine language instructions. 
These instructions are composed of a pair; mostly a list of operands and operational code. 
Opcode is the portion of the code that specifies the operations while Operands (the data to 
be processed) could provide extra information about the executable files (Zolotukhin and 
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Hamalainen, 2014). The source code of a given software, including Opcode, is more 
consistent and therefore suitable to produce signatures for malicious software-classes 
compared to compiled code. However, processing overhead (Carrillo and Lipman, 1988; 
Santos et al., 2013) and compiler optimisation (Alam et al., 2014a) are examples of 
challenges to be addressed when Opcode detection is utilised. Further, Opcode distribution 
has weakness against obfuscation techniques (Mahawer and Nagaraju, 2013; Alam et al., 
2014a), and it cannot be used to detect unknown malware (Rezaei et al., 2014a). 
 
Vinod et al. (2012) used Opcode sequences to calculate the similarity among 
malware executable files. Three different types of signatures were reported. Multiple 
Sequence Alignment was used to create single and group signatures whereas probabilistic 
signatures were constructed using Pair-wise alignment. Rezaei et al. (2014a) used the same 
Opcode sequence technique to compare two pieces of code extracted from executable files 
with the help of the Mishra Method and a Hidden Markov Model. According to the 
proposed model, Opcode extracted from a file was compared by calculating the probability 
of an existing virus, and Edit Distance was used to calculate the distance (or dissimilarity) 
between two strings created by the executable’s Opcodes with the help of probability 
factors and coordinate axis of a Detection Sphere. Rezaei et al. (2014b) amended the same 
approach to utilise Detection Circle instead of the previously used Detection Sphere.  
 
Alam et al. (2014a) proposed a unique approach for metamorphic malware 
detection called SWOD-CFWeight (Sliding Windows of Differences and Control Flow 
Weight). They used an intermediate language MAIL (Malware Analysis Intermediate 
Language) (Alam et al., 2013) to transform assembly code which makes the detection 
process platform-independent. SWOD represented the differences among Opcode 
distribution, changes in size whereas CFWeight, monitored the controlled information flow 
of a program, this has helped real-time detection to some extent. 
 
Mahawer and Nagaraju (2013) used Opcode with histogram intersection kernel 
and Support Vector Machine. Histogram intersection had been used to build an effective 
detection system for metamorphic malware. In this method, the detection method was 
based on Most Frequently Occurred (MFO) Opcodes in disassembled files, and code 
normalisation improved the detection rate. Opcode distance between malware and benign 
files was calculated with the help of the Euclidean Distance Equation. 
 
B. Control Flow Graph (CFG)  
 
CFG is a directed graph representation which has been in use for malware analysis and 
detection for many years. It is a representation of control flow of a program during its 
execution using graph notation such as nodes, straight line, edges. In CFG, statements such 
as assignments, copy statements, and branches are represented by nodes whereas control 
flow between every statement (i.e. what comes after next) is represented by an edge. CFG’s 
performance is not affected by code modification (Paul and Mishra, 2014). However, 
subgraph isomorphism consumes a high amount of time for processing and has an NP-
Complete and NP-Hard problem (Bai et al., 2009; Kim and Moon, 2010; Alam et al., 
2014a). An ideal model of CFG runs under offline mode (Paul and Mishra, 2014). 
 
Recent CFG proposals include (Agrawal et al., 2012), where the authors presented 
the use of Malware Abstraction Analysis (MAA) to compare high-level abstractions, these 
are flow graphs of targeted binaries that do not take low level syntax such as function call 
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and return, and conditional statements into consideration. Extracted graphs are referred to 
as ‘Rooted Tree’, and to compare these trees, the Edit Distance technique is used along 
with Approximating, Eliminating Search Algorithm (AESA). AESA helps to determine the 
nearest neighbour of the signature tree. Another proposal by Alam et al. (2014c) focused 
on real-time detection that is also platform independent. This was achieved by 
disassembling and translating the binary program into an intermediate language called 
Malware Analysis Intermediate Language (MAIL). Overall, CFG-based solutions can be 
very complex and expensive therefore may not be useful in filtering malware traffic in a 
high traffic link (Li et al., 2006). 
 
C. API Call  
 
Graphs are built by transforming the executable file into a call graph with the help of nodes 
and edges that respectively represent system calls and system call sequences. This 
technique utilises the relationship between the API Calls (Elhadi et al., 2013). Lee et al., 
(2010) developed a method based on semantic analysis in which call sequences were first 
converted to API Call Graphs. And to avoid the NP-complete problem, API Call Graphs 
were then reduced to code graphs. They were stored and used later to measure the similarity 
against code graph extracted from input program files. The method achieved a DR of 98% 
and was tested against three code obfuscation techniques, namely: code insertion, code 
reordering, and code replacement. Moreover, meaningless system call insertion is another 
obfuscation technique that could still increase the number of FPR, in response, Elhadi et 
al., (2014) developed Lee’s method further by introducing sequence profile and a scheme 
for data dependency to generate more accurate call graphs. The idea is based on the 
observation that more than half of the discovered malware samples are derived from known 
samples. However, if polymorphic techniques are used to pack the malware, then extracted 
API call lists and its parameters would be incorrect. 
 
Kwon and Lee (2012) method applied graph mining technique to construct 
semantic signatures. As graph matching leads to NP-complete, they used the matrix data 
structure technique for semantic graph matching by computing XOR operations only in 
contrary to (Lee et al., 2010). While in (Wu et al., 2013) call graphs were generated from 
a programme’s function using assembly code adopting a breadth-first approach. Vertices 
were matched with the help of a function matching process and graph colouring techniques. 
Cosine similarity was used which could be problematic when similar functions or substitute 
instructions are used. A key phase of this method was to disassemble executable files, 
which is quite challenging, and the reliability of function matching based on graph 
colouring are reduced when instructions from one class are identified as equivalent to 
another e.g. the ‘ECX’ and ‘MOV’ instructions (Wu et al., 2013).  
 
 
D. A Hybrid Approach 
 
Malware with obfuscation techniques can deceive detection systems, it usually changes its 
code with pre-defined impact on its key behaviour. Therefore, signature-based detection 
becomes irrelevant while, as discussed earlier, behavioural analysis introduces time cost 
and a requirement for extra processing. Further, DR could arguably be enhanced when two 
methods are combined. To inherit advantages from multiple methods into an integrated 
solution, hybrid techniques were introduced. For instance, Eskandari and Hashemi (2011) 
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combined API Call Graph and CFG. The proposed system consisted of three phases. First, 
the executable is disassembled with a pre-processing algorithm to remove unnecessary 
statements and to generate CFGs. Then, API Call Graphs can be generated with the help 
of a labelling algorithm. Finally, features are generated based on the API Call Graphs.  
 
A semantic set method was proposed by Van Nhuong et al. (2014a), it combines 
data mining techniques namely N-gram with a modified Naïve Bayes classifying algorithm 
to reduce processing time and increase accuracy. Semantic sets were used as an input for 
the Naïve Bayes classifier. The authors have also developed an automatic tracer tool to 
resist malware obfuscation. Another experiment presented in (Van Nhuong et al., 2014b) 
combined three methods including Semantic Set, N-gram byte using the Naïve Bayes 
Classifier and finally an API function-based signature detection method. The latter being 
used to perform static detection with the help of a string matching algorithm to reduce the 
detection time (Navarro, 2001). Combining three different methods helped achieving high 
accuracy (DR) while the key challenge identified concerns optimisation for real-time 
detection to reduce time. 
 
E. Other Techniques 
 
Martins et al. (2014) identified nodes on the basis of their relationship and characteristics 
in a Dependency Graph extracted from an executable file. This would then help to create a 
model resilient to code mutation. Further, the authors presented a method to extract graphs 
from binary. The DR achieved was 70%. Another exemplar to this category is a method 
proposed by Saleh et al. (2011), they have modified a face recognition technique to detect 
malware. The technique assumes that every face had a linear combination of basic sets, 
some of these could change over time to some extent, but not all of them. As such, the 
method has the required capability of measuring the similarity and difference between 
samples. The authors used a static analysis tool called Principal Composite Analysis and 
the system database was trained to identify malware. A distance classifier was then 
computed for the new input file to be checked against the database. If the distance was 
below the threshold then the input file was considered as malware. The system used a 
technique called Euclidean Distance to measure the distance of four classes which is good 
for a small training set but might not deliver the same results with a high number of 
malware classes (Shanmugam et al., 2013). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis of infection and obfuscation techniques utilised by metamorphic malware is 
fundamental to develop an effective and efficient detection method. Static Analysis extract 
information such as device metadata, network connection states and changes to registry 
files related to suspected software. Whilst Dynamic Analysis, known as Behavioural 
Analysis, observes the interactions of the malicious file within a Sandbox. A combination 
of the above two techniques has potential to deliver better outcomes in terms of detection 
rate and false positives. Two key elements have been extracted, reviewed and examined in 
this systematic review, namely detection methods and their accompanying statistics 
(empirical evidence) to evaluate their efficiency. The first technique observed was Opcode 
based, Operands of Opcode provide additional information about the suspicious file 
(Zolotukhin and Hamalainen, 2014) which might help in detecting other malware variants. 
However, this will require large number of labelled executables for each variant, and it is 
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difficult to acquire such data (Santos et al., 2011). Other challenges include the cost of 
extra processing time (Santos et al., 2011; Alam et al., 2014b).  
 
Obfuscation is efficient to easily evade detection when Opcode is utilised (Preda, 
2012; Mahawer and Nagaraju, 2013) this is mainly due to the change affecting Opcode 
distribution which thereafter results in the creation of a vague abstract model for 
metamorphic malware detection (Alam et al., 2014c). Likewise, CFG and API Call Graph 
based techniques are not effective against encryption/encoding obfuscation techniques (Li 
et al., 2006; Elhadi et al., 2014). CFG uses static analysis and requires human interaction 
during the process causing imprecise outcome. Hence, a more dynamic approach is 
recommended (Moser et al., 2007). Contrary to Opcode, CFG is unable to generate 
signatures for a file with small foot prints (Paul and Mishra, 2014) which may yield a high 
FPR. When API Call Graph is used, extracted API call lists and its parameters would be 
incorrect when the Malware uses encryption. Furthermore, another challenge is related to 
the extraction process itself using graph construction algorithms (Elhadi et al., 2014) 
because operating system resources are not included as graph nodes in call graph. API Call 
Graph depends upon graph construction and may not complete in terms of the number of 
nodes (Park et al., 2013). Adopting a graph based approach is expensive, complex (Li et 
al., 2006), and has a problem of NP Complete (Bai et al., 2009; Alam et al, 2014c). 
Nonetheless, a recent study by Salehi et al. (2017) whose method generated features for 
both return and argument values of recorded API call lists, obtained DR of 99.9% with less 
than 1% FPR using 1211/3175 malware and benign samples respectively. 
 
Semantic set is a recently introduced technique to identify metamorphic malware 
(Van Nhuong et al., 2014a). However, it cannot detect obfuscated malware and requires a 
lot of human interaction for hex conversion and information manipulation. Therefore, 
while detection rate is very promising, practical implementation is technically challenging 
due to the amount of manual input required.  
 
Another recent study by Mehra et al. (2015) combined API Call Graph, CFG and 
Histogram. The proposed system consisted of three phases. Firstly, the executable is 
disassembled with a pre-processing algorithm to remove unnecessary statements and to 
generate CFGs. Next, API Call Graphs are generated with the help of a labelling algorithm. 
Then, features are generated based on the API Call Graphs. Histograms are created using 
features same as that of API Call and then used to classify files as either malicious or 
benign. Khodamoradi et al. (2015) used a decision tree to compute statistics about Opcode 
and build thresholds. They used a tool called Opcode Statistic Extractor (OSE) to analyse 
disassembled code and calculate Opcode frequency. This was then fed into a classifier to 
determine whether the code is malicious. Work on classification or categorization methods 
is out of scope for this survey, but it is inevitable to include a brief demonstrate on how it 
can be utilised to counteract malware since it is incorporated within many Hybrid detection 
approaches as shown below. In principle, the classification process consists of pre-
processing and dimensionality reduction techniques, feature selection, feature 
representation (term weighting), and then selected algorithms (classifiers) are trained on 
the data set. To increase accuracy, a hybrid approach can also be deployed by integrating 
multiple algorithms and stemming techniques into this process (Alabbas et al., 2016). 
O’Kane et al., (2016) proposed using reduced Opcode set for detecting obfuscated 
malware. In their research, Support Vector Machine was used to classify files. The Opcode 
data set is created by extracting Opcode density histogram during program execution.  
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Mirzazadeh et al. (2015) demonstrated how to detect metamorphic malware 
particularly NGVCK and MWOR using a Linear Discriminant Analysis method. The 
research framework was based on Opcode Graph Similarity (OGS) of Runwall et al. (2015) 
which trimmed lifeless ciphers from the graph. Basic Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) 
features such as modifications among class and unpredictability within class were selected 
as detection criteria. The LDA method used the following phases: pre-processing, training, 
set threshold and prediction (Raphel & Vinod, 2015). The result of the method obtained 
detection accuracy rate of 99.7% for MWOR and 100% for NGVCK malwares 
respectively.  Analogous to the LDA based technique is the research of Kuriakose and 
Vinod (2015) which detected NGVCK and MWORM metamorphic malware with 100% 
accuracy when 125 features ranking Opcode techniques were deployed to calculate 
similarity in their file execution. The technique arrived at a Markov Blanket detection 
correctness of 100% for both NGVCK and MWORM with 1.0 precision. It can be inferred 
that the LDA technique suppresses feebleness of OGS when results were contributed from 
all edges and nodes, whereas LDA pruned the junk edges from the graphs thus establishing 
a distinguished detection threshold between benign programs and metamorphic malware. 
 
Nevertheless, another new proposal by Saleh et al. (2011) utilised a modified 
version of a face recognition technique to detect malware. This technique uses static 
analysis which always requires human interaction to train and update data. Any approach 
that requires direct human interaction is time consuming and should be automated (Moser 
et al., 2007). This technique is based on pattern matching and therefore liable to issues such 
as the 2D pattern matching problem in image making. 
 
The included studies emphasised on several key challenges particularly facing the 
detection process for metamorphic malware, some of which have been briefly discussed in 
the literature in studies such as (Yoshioka and Matsumoto, 2009) and (Kim and Moon, 
2010): 
 
Obfuscation/Evasion. Mainly because obfuscation techniques change the abstract 
behavioural model used to define the behaviour of a given software. Further, if malware 
writers have the knowledge of the basic mutation process and detection algorithms used 
for originating these abstract models, they could amend new designs to evade detection. 
 
Dynamic Analysis. To analyse the behaviour of metamorphic malware, a Sandbox is 
required to make sure that it would not affect any interconnected environment including 
the network. The implementation is simpler with static analysis where you can disconnect 
network connection, while the Internet could be required for dynamic analysis.  
 
Precise Signature. System and Programming languages use control flow and data flow 
techniques to analyse the behaviour of metamorphic malware. However, these techniques 
are difficult to apply on metamorphic malware due to its nature of code mutation which 
will cause time and result in many false positives and false negatives. 
 
Human Interaction. Human input can be fundamental to establish a detection model to 
work more accurately. 
 
Application Difficulty. When metamorphic malware mutates itself, it becomes very 
difficult to extract a precise signature that is used in detecting a wide range of malware 
variants. 
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APPENDIX 1 - Evaluation of selected reviewed papers 
 
This section presents a comparative analysis of studied papers. The purpose of this comparative analysis is to provide a clear view to the reader 
on strengths and weaknesses of selected reviewed papers. The comparative analysis is shown below in the Table 1. 
  
 
Table 1. A comparative analysis of studied papers 
S# Papers Techniques Approach Strengths Limitations Validation 
Dataset size 
(# of files) 
DR% FPR% 
1 (Mahawer and Nagaraju, 2013) Opcode 
The detection method is 
based on Most Frequently 
Occurred (MFO) histograms 
of Opcodes in disassembled 
files. 
Effective against dead code 
insertion, registry renaming, 
code reordering. 
Cannot detect malware 
with obfuscation 
capabilities, this will 
cause a high rate of FNs.  
Validated by 
experimental result 
showing significant 
figures in FPR and DR. 
2121 99.5% 0.01% 
2 (Alam et al., 2014a) Opcode 
Detecting metamorphic 
malware by computing 
weight of MAIL pattern and 
Control Flow Weight then 
matching them using index 
based signature array 
Platform independent and 
support automated analysis 
with the help of intermediate 
language. 
1- Better detection 
results are limited to 
small size dataset 
2- Large datasets 
increase the complexity 
and is time consuming. 
3- Compiler optimisation 
could affect frequency of 
Opcode 
4- Vulnerable to 
obfuscation 
The results are validated 
by experiments but 10 
fold cross validation 
technique has been used 
which makes the results 
more bias compared to 5 
fold cross validation. 
1251 99.1% 0.93% 
3 (Rezaei et al., 2014a) Opcode 
Detecting metamorphic 
malware by comparing 
probability set percentage 
between sample and virus 
family using Markov 
properties. 
Proposed method is based on 
Hidden Markov Model and 
showed higher efficiency 
against others antiviruses 
compared. 
Unable to detect 
unknown metamorphic 
malware. 
Validated by 
experimental results 
showing improvement in 
FPR. 
3120 94% 0% 
       
       
       
   Effective Methods to Detect Metamorphic Malware: A Systematic Review  16   
 
    
 
 
   
       
       
       
 
 
S# Papers Techniques Approach Strengths Limitations Validation 
Dataset size 
(# of files) 
DR% FPR% 
4 (Vinod et al., 2012) Opcode 
Detecting metamorphic 
malware using 
bioinformatics sequence 
alignment based on Multiple 
Sequence alignment to align 
Opcode sequence 
Strong logical motivation 
derived from DNA sequences 
of inheriting functional, 
structure similarity from one 
generation to other same as 
applied in metamorphic 
malware 
1-Large numbers of 
mismatch mnemonic 
pairs cause less 
Detection Rate.  
2-Increased FPR in 
single signatures, 
degraded in DR in group 
and probabilistic 
signatures.   
Validated by 
experimental results. 
Shows technique that 
needs improvement. 
724 71% 7% 
5 (Rezaei et al., 2014b) Opcode 
Detecting encrypted 
metamorphic malware by 
comparing probability set 
percentage between sample 
and virus family using 
Markov properties. 
Proposed method is based on 
Hidden Markov model for 
encrypted malware and 
showed higher efficiency 
against other antiviruses 
compared. 
1- Unable to detect 
unknown metamorphic 
malware. 
2- Require extensive 
calculation 
3- Vulnerable to 
obfuscation 
Validated by 
experimental results 
indicating good 
efficiency as compare to 
other antiviruses 
involved in the 
experiment. 
192 70% N/A 
6 (Alam et al., 2014c) CFG 
Protecting end user from 
metamorphic malware  in 
real-time 
MAIL intermediate language 
have capability to provide 
patterns for matching to 
enhance the metamorphic 
malware detection. It also 
capable of platform and 
analysis independent. 
Time consuming while 
examining large dataset. 
Validated by 
experimental results 
showing 
significant/effective DR 
but FPR is very high. 
510 98.9% 4.5% 
7 (Eskandari and Hashmi, 2011) Hybrid 
A combination of control 
flow graph and API Call 
Graph is used to detect 
metamorphic malware.  
Using semantic aspects, 
method is capable of 
detecting obfuscated files. 
Slow computational 
process. 
Ineffective with non-
assembly malware. 
Validated by 
experiments in 
comparison to different 
classifier. 
4445 97.5% 1.97% 
8 (Agrawal et al., 2012) CFG 
To overcome graph 
comparison problem, 
normalised metric edit 
distance technique is 
employed. 
High level semantic signature 
enable detection of unknown 
new variants of the same 
family.  
Ineffective with non-
assembly malware. 
Validated by 
experimental statistics, 
showing 
significant/effective 
results in FPR but needs 
more work on Detection. 
18 86% 0% 
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S# Papers Techniques Approach Strengths Limitations Validation 
Dataset size 
(# of files) 
DR% FPR% 
9 (Martins et al., 2014) 
Dependency 
Graph 
Identifying related nodes on 
the basis of its relationship 
and characteristics in 
dependency graph extracted 
for an executable file. 
It is capable of eliminating 
the impact of obfuscation 
techniques on malicious 
code.  
Identifying relationship 
between nodes and 
relevant events requires 
a statistical inference 
technique. 
Validated by 
experimental results 
showing an 
improvement in 
identification of 
metamorphic malware 
compared to the 
approach used as 
reference model in (Kim 
and Moon, 2010). 
63 70% N/A 
10 (Elhadi et al., 2014) API Call 
Enhancing API Call Graph 
construction by integrating 
API call and system 
resources with the help of 
four type of dependencies 
between nodes. 
Sequence profiling & data 
dependencies to generate 
accurate call graph. It takes 
both signature and behaviour 
input sample. 
Dynamic analysis might 
not explore important 
API call’s execution. 
Approach has weakness 
against polymorphic 
code modification.  
Time consuming in term 
of matching process and 
graph construction. 
Validated by 
experimental results 
showing improvement in 
FPR and DR. 
514 98% 0% 
11 (Kwon and Lee, 2012) API Call 
Transformation of API Call 
Graphs to sub graphs on the 
basis of behaviour semantic 
and related functionalities. 
Proposed method has ability 
to detect many malware 
variants with the help of few 
signatures that also reduces 
signature storage space and 
analysis time.   
Algorithm used for 
graph extraction cannot 
build accurate graph 
from instruction derived 
from malware sample. 
Ineffective with non-
assembly malware.  
Validated by 
experimental showing 
significant figures in  
DR with no FPs. 1863 98% 0% 
12 (Wu et al., 2013) API Call 
API Call Graphs are 
generated and similarity is 
computed using cosine 
similarity method. 
Proposed method is more 
robust against obfuscation 
techniques and effective for 
malware variants detection.   
Ineffective with non-
assembly malware. 
Cosine similarity fails 
when comparing small 
graphs. 
Validated by 
experiments performed 
on prototype system. More than 
200 pair 
98% N/A 
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S# Papers Techniques Approach Strengths Limitations Validation 
Dataset size 
(# of files) 
DR% FPR% 
13 (Lee et al., 2010) API Call 
Mechanism based on 
semantic characteristics 
using code graph system 
before file execution.   
Proposed method reduces the 
number of malware signature 
by detecting all of the 
malware variants with single 
signature of original malware 
and have ability to defeat 
evasion techniques.  
Weakness in detecting 
malwares having 
insertion of useless 
system calls. 
Validated by 
experiments show low 
DR at 91% and no 
availability of FPR. 
300 91% N/A 
14 (Van Nhuong et al., 2014a) Hybrid 
Combination of two different 
methods to build a detection 
system which inherits the 
advantages of both methods 
in detecting malware 
including obfuscated. 
Tracer tool automatically 
extract semantic sets that 
overcomes malware 
obfuscation. Detection is 
near to perfection.  
Processing time needs to 
be optimised. It does not 
support real-time 
detection. 
The results are validated 
by experiments with two 
different sizes of 
datasets. 
DS1=107 
DS2=79 
100% N/A 
15 (Van Nhuong et al., 2014b) Hybrid 
Combination of three 
different methods to build a 
powerful detection system to 
detect all type of malware  
DR is achieved up to 100%. It does not support real-
time detection. 
Processing time needs to 
be optimised. 
The results are validated 
by experiments with two 
different sizes of 
datasets. 
DS1=107 
DS2=79 
100% N/A 
16 (Saleh et al., 2011) Eigenfaces 
Based on face recognition 
technique with some 
modification assuming that 
every face has a linear 
combination of basic set with 
some changes. 
Method is capable of 
learning new virus patterns 
for future malware 
recognition.  
1- Time consuming in 
term of pattern matching 
process. 
2- Distance measuring 
technique used is simple 
and limited to high 
number of dataset for 
better results. 
Validated by 
experimental results 
showing 100% in DR 
but FPR is high. 
1250 100% 4% 
 
 
